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Abstract 
Both liberals and conservatives accuse their political opponents of partisan bias, but is there 
empirical evidence that one side of the political aisle is indeed more biased than the other? To 
address this question, we meta-analyzed the results of 51 experimental studies, involving over 
18,000 participants, that examined one form of partisan bias -- the tendency to evaluate 
otherwise identical information more favorably when it supports one’s political beliefs or 
allegiances than when it challenges those beliefs or allegiances. Based on previous literature, two 
hypotheses were tested: an asymmetry hypothesis (predicting greater partisan bias in 
conservatives than liberals) and a symmetry hypothesis (predicting equal levels of partisan bias 
in liberals and conservatives). Mean overall partisan bias was robust (r = .245) and there was 
strong support for the symmetry hypothesis: liberals (r = .235) and conservatives (r = .255) 
showed no difference in mean levels of bias across studies. Moderator analyses reveal this 
pattern to be consistent across a number of different methodological variations and political 
topics. Implications of the current findings for the ongoing ideological symmetry debate, and the 
role of partisan bias in scientific discourse and political conflict are discussed.  
Keywords: bias, motivated reasoning, ideology, politics, meta-analysis 
Word Count: 190 
 
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Peter H. Ditto, Department of 
Psychology & Social Behavior, 4201 Social & Behavioral Sciences Gateway, University of 
California, Irvine, CA 92697-7085. Email: phditto@uci.edu. 
 
  
BIAS IS BIPARTISAN   2 
 
At Least Bias is Bipartisan: 
  A Meta-Analytic Comparison of Partisan Bias in Liberals and Conservatives  
We asked 951 American visitors to the website YourMorals.org how well they thought the 
term “biased” described the average Democrat and the average Republican. Respondents 
describing themselves as Democrats saw the average Republican as substantially more biased 
than the average Democrat. Republican respondents expressed the mirror image belief that the 
average Democrat was substantially more biased than the average Republican (see Figure 1). 
This finding should be unsurprising to even a casual observer of contemporary American 
politics. A few hours watching cable news or reading accounts of political events on any of 
hundreds of partisan websites will reveal a pervasive narrative in which political allies are 
characterized as rational, informed, and reasonable, whereas political opponents are described as 
irrational “low information voters” blinded by partisan bias. These recriminations are distinctly 
mutual, to the point that politicians and pundits from both the left and right rely on the same 
colorful phrases to capture how the other side is “drinking the koolaid” (Huffington, 2002; 
O’Reilly, 2005) or suffering from one form or another of “derangement syndrome” (Horowitz, 
2008; Krauthammer, 2003; Raimondo, 2016).  
In this article, we take such reciprocal accusations of partisan bias as our starting point and 
ask the question of which side’s accusations, if either, are correct. Is there empirical evidence to 
support the contention that one side of the political aisle is more biased than the other? Or is 
partisan bias a bipartisan problem, or perhaps little problem at all?  
Assessing the magnitude of partisan bias across the political spectrum is a challenging task, 
ill-suited to examination in a single survey or experiment. As such, we report a targeted meta-
analytic comparison of the magnitude of one particular variety of partisan bias in liberals and 
conservatives--the tendency to evaluate otherwise identical information more favorably when it 
supports one’s political beliefs or allegiances than when it challenges those beliefs or 
allegiances--examining results from 51 different experimental tests involving over 18,000 
participants. 
Defining Partisan Bias 
At the broadest level, partisan bias refers to a general tendency for people to think or act in 
ways that unwittingly favor their own political group or cast their own ideologically-based 
beliefs in a favorable light. Politically involved individuals, of course, hold many beliefs that 
favor their chosen political party or ideology, and many engage in actions deliberately intended 
to promote the political groups they identify with and the political beliefs they hold. Our focus is 
on cases where this favoritism is less conscious and intentional, such that the individual is 
generally unaware that their political affinities have affected their judgments or behavior. This 
kind of partisan bias can take many forms and occur at multiple levels of the information 
processing sequence, including selectively exposing oneself to information that supports one’s 
own political group or views (e.g., Iyengar & Hahn, 2009; Stroud, 2008), selectively 
remembering information that supports one’s own political group or views (e.g., Frenda, 
Knowles, Saletan, & Loftus, 2013), and most prototypically, selectively evaluating information 
in ways that support one’s own political group or views (e.g., Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979).  
In real world political discourse, partisan bias is often labeled as hypocrisy; applying 
different (and harsher) standards when evaluating the judgments and behavior of political 
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opponents than when evaluating similar or identical judgments or behaviors displayed by 
political allies. Analogously, the classic approach to empirical examination of partisan bias is to 
ask participants to evaluate “matched” information: information that is as identical as possible in 
every way except that in one case it favors the participant’s political affinities (politically-
congenial information) and in the other it challenges those affinities (politically-uncongenial 
information). For example, Lord et al. (1979) recruited participants with strong attitudes either in 
support of or in opposition to capital punishment and asked them to rate the methodological 
quality of fictitious but realistic empirical studies examining whether the death penalty deters 
homicide. Two versions of the studies were created: one with results supporting the deterrent 
efficacy of capital punishment, and one with results showing that capital punishment actually 
increased rather than decreased homicide rates. Both pro- and anti-capital punishment 
participants rated the studies as better quality research when the results supported their views on 
the efficacy of capital punishment than when they challenged those views, despite the fact that 
the methodologies of the studies were held constant across conditions and only the results were 
altered. Similarly, Cohen (2003) presented participants self-identifying as Democrats or 
Republicans with identical welfare policies that were said to be strongly supported by either the 
majority of Congressional Democrats or the majority of Congressional Republicans. Both 
Democratic and Republican participants expressed more positive views of the identical policy 
when it was ostensibly supported by members of their own party than by members of the 
opposition party. 
These studies rely on a logic for demonstrating bias that is ubiquitous, albeit typically 
implicit, in psychological research and grounded in the logic of expected utility theory (von 
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). According to Kahneman and Tversky (1984; see also Keys & 
Schwartz, 2007), a fundamental axiom of all analyses of rational choice is the principle of 
invariance: judgments should not be affected by trivial (i.e., decision irrelevant) changes in the 
way information is presented. If a decision is affected by whether otherwise identical alternatives 
are presented in terms of the number of lives lost versus the number saved (Tversky &, 
Kahneman, 1981) or the identical behavior is perceived differently when it is enacted by an 
African-American than by a White person (Duncan, 1976), then some deviation from rationality 
(i.e., bias) is implicated. Analogously, if the identical scientific study or policy proposal is 
evaluated differently depending on whether it reflects positively on liberals or conservatives, 
partisan bias is implied and the magnitude of that bias (i.e., the divergence between how that 
study or policy is evaluated when it is politically-congenial vs. politically-uncongenial) can be 
gauged and compared as to whether that differential evaluation is significantly more pronounced 
for those on the political left or right. 
Belying the simplicity of this analysis, applying the logic of invariance in actual empirical 
studies faces a number of challenges (Kahan, 2016; Keys & Schwartz, 2007). Information 
supplied to participants must be experimentally manipulated and carefully matched to rule out 
inadvertent informational differences between conditions. This minimizes the possibility that the 
manipulated information (e.g., frame, race, politics) itself conveys relevant information that 
could plausibly account for differential judgments from a Bayesian or related normative 
perspective. Still, the difficulty of ruling out counter-explanations based on cognitive factors 
such as expectations (“priors” in Bayesian terms) has vexed research on motivated perception 
and reasoning for decades (Ditto, 2009; Erdelyi, 1974; Miller & Ross, 1975; Nisbett & Ross, 
1980; Tetlock & Levi, 1982). Such counter-explanations are notoriously difficult to rule out 
completely, but their plausibility is reduced to the extent that a) the politically-congenial and 
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politically-uncongenial information presented to participants are matched in every way possible 
except for their agreement with a participant’s political beliefs or allegiances, and b) participants’ 
evaluations are specifically focused on the validity or quality of the matched information 
provided rather than a general assessment of the information’s conclusion.  
Evidence for Asymmetrical Partisan Bias 
Interest in locating bias along the political spectrum has deep roots in psychology, stretching 
back at least to work by Adorno and colleagues on the authoritarian personality (Adorno, 
Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950). Although the specifics have evolved over the 
years (Altemeyer 1981; 1996), the essential thesis of this research tradition is that deep-seated 
conflicts (psychodynamic and/or interpersonal) predispose some people to extreme “conservative” 
views characterized by conventionalism, antipathy toward minority groups, a preference for 
strong authoritarian leaders, and rigid black-or-white/good-or-bad thinking. 
Recent research in political psychology has updated and reinforced this notion that 
conservative political views are tied to biased thinking and, in particular, resistance to novel or 
threatening information. For example, political conservatism has been described as a form of 
motivated social cognition associated with a host of personal dispositions related to resistance to 
change (dogmatism, low levels of openness to experience, and high need for order, structure, and 
closure; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). Other work has found associations 
between conservatism and threat sensitivity (Hibbing, Smith, & Alford, 2014; Lilienfeld & 
Latzman, 2014), avoidant search strategies (Shook & Fazio, 2009), shallow system 1 thinking 
(Eidelman, Crandall, Goodman, & Blanchar, 2012), valuation of group loyalty (Graham et al., 
2013), and self-enhancement motivation (Wojcik, Hovasapian, Graham, Motyl, & Ditto, 2015). 
All of these factors could plausibly manifest themselves as a stronger tendency among political 
conservatives than political liberals to favor information that supports rather than challenges their 
political affinities.    
Evidence for Symmetrical Partisan Bias 
No analogous research tradition has championed a hypothesis of greater bias in liberals than 
conservatives. There is, however, considerable theory and data to suggest that conservatives do 
not have a monopoly on bias. Most generally, the psychological literature is replete with 
examples of motivated reasoning, particularly in the form of self and group-enhancing biases, 
and these biases have been found in a multitude of different populations and contexts (Alicke, 
1985; Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Darley & Gross, 1983; Ditto, 2009; Hastorf & Cantril, 1954; Kunda, 
1990; Mercier & Sperber, 2011). There is little reason to expect political liberalism to provide 
immunity against motivated reasoning, and some reason to expect that political and moral 
judgments in general may be particularly vulnerable to motivational and affective influence 
(Ditto, Pizarro, & Tannenbaum, 2009; Haidt, 2001).  
More specifically, just as the “rigidity-of-the-right” hypothesis underlying work on the 
authoritarian personality was challenged almost immediately by arguments that extreme 
ideologues at both ends of the political spectrum tend toward cognitive inflexibility (Rokeach, 
1956; Shils, 1954; Taylor, 1960), recent research confirms that many tendencies often viewed as 
particularly characteristic of conservative thought are found in liberals too, if you look in the 
right place. The central theme of this work is that all people are motivated to defend core beliefs 
and moral commitments, but because beliefs, commitments, and moral sensitivities differ across 
the political spectrum (e.g., Graham et al., 2013), similar motivations will lead liberals and 
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conservatives to direct bias and intolerance toward different topics and targets (e.g., Brandt, 
Reyna, Chambers, Crawford, & Wetherell, 2014). This analysis suggests that, in terms of any 
specific political judgment, either liberal or conservative bias could be magnified depending on 
how that judgment impacts each side’s core commitments (Crawford, 2012; 2014), but that if 
judgments were aggregated across politically relevant topics, both sides would reveal an equal 
proclivity to bend information in their political favor. Implicit in this analysis is that academic 
psychology’s particular focus on bias in political conservatives is largely a function of the blind 
spots (Pronin, 2007) of a scientific discipline overwhelmingly composed of political liberals 
(Duarte et al., 2015; Inbar & Lammers, 2012). 
The Current Study 
How bias is distributed across the political spectrum is clearly a matter of current empirical 
debate. Two different hypotheses can be supported by evidence in the literature: an asymmetry 
hypothesis that predicts greater partisan bias in conservatives than liberals, and a symmetry 
hypothesis that predicts that levels of partisan bias will not differ between liberals and 
conservatives. It is also possible, of course, that partisan bias could be greater in liberals than 
conservatives even though this hypothesis has not received extensive attention in the literature. 
The current study seeks to evaluate these hypotheses in a targeted meta-analytic comparison of 
the magnitude of one prototypical form of partisan bias in American liberals and conservatives.   
We selected meta-analysis as our approach to take advantage of the wealth of data on 
partisan bias that have already been collected. Meta-analysis also allows us to examine partisan 
biases across studies using differing operationalizations of acceptance of/resistance to political 
information, left versus right political orientation, and judgments about a variety of political 
topics. Given the challenges of differentiating partisan bias from some form of rational belief 
updating, we restricted our analysis to studies where the strongest inferences about bias can be 
made: experimental studies, similar to those conducted by Lord and colleagues (1979) and 
Cohen (2003), that used matched information designs to explore partisan biases in the processing 
of politically-congenial and politically-uncongenial information. These studies come from many 
different labs, including scholars who support both the symmetry and asymmetry perspectives. 
Our goal is to provide a thorough representation of the extant psychological research regarding 
susceptibility to partisan bias in liberals and conservatives. 
Method 
We conducted literature searches using PsycINFO, Psych Articles, and Worldwide Poli Sci 
databases. We searched for the following terms anywhere in the main text: “bias* assim*,” 
“confirm* bias*,” “my* bias*,” “bias* evaluat*,” “motiv* reason*,” and “motiv* skeptic*.” We 
also searched for the reverse construction of each term (e.g., “assim* bias*”). We included the 
term polit* in each search to limit our results to studies with political content. An initial search 
was conducted in October 2012 and updated in October 2014 and December 2016. In an effort to 
locate studies that fit our inclusion criteria but were not published or did not fall under our 
literature search terms, we performed a search of the Social Science Research Network (SSRN, 
an online repository that contains both unpublished and published works), emailed the Society 
for Personality and Social Psychology listserv and well-known researchers in the field requesting 
papers fitting our criteria, and searched the references list of articles that fit our inclusion criteria. 
Two additional articles were suggested by one of the reviewers of the initial version of this 
article. These searches returned a total of over 1,500 articles, book chapters, and dissertations.   
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After an initial culling of articles that were clearly inappropriate for inclusion (e.g., non-
empirical pieces), each remaining article was evaluated by at least two members of our research 
team as to whether it met four inclusion criteria (listed below). In rare instances of disagreement, 
decisions were resolved through discussion with the whole group. 
Inclusion Criteria 
The four criteria for a study to be included in our analysis were the manipulation of political 
congeniality, the measurement of left-right political orientation, a measure of information 
evaluation, and a sample composed of American participants. 
Manipulation of political congeniality. Included studies had to manipulate (either within or 
between subjects) whether participants were presented with stimuli that either a) supported or 
opposed their political beliefs (e.g., Lord et al., 1979) or b) associated a particular policy or 
behavior with the participant’s own or the opposing political party (e.g., Cohen, 2003). Political 
congeniality manipulations included fictional scientific studies with results supporting either 
liberal or conservative beliefs, examples of similar behavior demonstrated by liberal or 
conservative actors, and identical policies endorsed by Democratic versus Republican politicians. 
We excluded studies where the manipulated information was only loosely matched, such as 
studies presenting participants with persuasive essays for liberal and conservative positions that 
differed substantially in their content (e.g., Taber & Lodge, 2006).  
Measure of left-right political orientation. Included studies had to measure participants’ 
self-reported placement on a left/liberal to right/conservative dimension of political orientation. 
Variations included measures of liberal-conservative ideology, Democratic versus Republican 
party affiliation, and endorsement of specific attitudes with a clear left-right dimension (e.g., pro-
gun control vs. anti-gun control). We did not include studies that only measured personality 
dimensions associated with political ideology (e.g., right wing authoritarianism) or that equated 
conservative ideology with prejudicial attitudes (e.g., toward African-Americans). Studies were 
also excluded if they included only one ideological group (e.g., conservatives only), as deriving 
estimates of bias from liberals and conservatives evaluating the same closely matched stimuli 
most effectively leverages the power of matched information designs to isolate and compare the 
magnitude of partisan bias. 
Information evaluation measure. Studies needed to measure participants’ evaluation of the 
validity, quality, or acceptance of the matched politically-congenial and politically-uncongenial 
information. Examples of information evaluation measures included ratings of a scientific 
study’s methodological quality, approval/disapproval of a political actor’s behavior, and 
endorsement of specific policy proposals presented in the stimulus materials. Studies were not 
included if their only evaluation measure was endorsement of a general political attitude (e.g., 
attitude toward capital punishment after reading a study on capital punishment) given the 
vulnerability of general attitudinal measures to normative counter-explanation.1  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1!An individual’s prior level of support or opposition to capital punishment (for example) should not rationally 
affect how that individual judges the methodological quality of any particular study examining the effectiveness of 
capital punishment, as the quality of any specific study is independent of the general attitude. On the other hand, 
prior attitude could plausibly affect the general level of support or opposition to capital punishment expressed after 
exposure to a particular study even if no biased judgment occurred. For example, a participant beginning a study 
opposed to capital punishment might still be more opposed to capital punishment after reading a study supporting it !
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American sample. Although we have no reason to doubt the generality of political bias, our 
particular interest is on liberal-conservative differences in the context of American politics. 
Because of this focus and the difficulties of defining liberal and conservative in different national 
contexts, we included only studies with participants from the U.S. 
Of the articles evaluated, 48 included data that met all four inclusion criteria. Because the 
majority of qualifying articles were interested in documenting the existence of partisan bias in 
general rather than cross-ideological comparisons of bias, only 11 of 48 articles included enough 
information to calculate separate liberal and conservative effect sizes. For the remaining articles, 
we contacted authors and asked them to provide additional analyses or data to perform these 
analyses ourselves. For 10 articles, the relevant data were no longer available or the authors did 
not respond to our requests. For articles with multiple studies, each unique sample was counted 
as an individual study and contributed one effect size in the main analyses. If a study included 
judgments about multiple topics manipulated between subjects (i.e., some participants responded 
to materials about gun control and others responded to materials about capital punishment; e.g., 
MacCoun & Paletz, 2009), effect sizes for each topic were entered as a separate “study.” Our 
final sample included effect sizes from 51 studies culled from 38 articles, with a total N of 
18,815 participants (see Table 1 for the full list of included studies).    
Primary Analyses 
Evaluations of politically-congenial versus politically-uncongenial stimuli were reported as ts 
or Fs and dfs, betas and SEs, chi-square and sample sizes, or Ms, SDs, and sample sizes. For each 
study, we computed a Pearson’s r effect size for overall partisan bias (roverall). Positive values 
reflect the degree to which, among both liberals and conservatives, participants responded more 
positively to politically-congenial information than to politically-uncongenial information. 
We examined support for the symmetry versus asymmetry hypotheses in two ways. First, we 
calculated separate partisan bias effect sizes for liberals and conservatives for each study (rliberal 
and rconservative).2  Positive rliberal values indicate liberals evaluated liberal-friendly stimuli more 
positively than conservative-friendly stimuli. Likewise, positive rconservative values indicate 
conservatives evaluated conservative-friendly stimuli more positively than liberal-friendly 
stimuli. Second, we calculated an rdifference effect size from each study reflecting the degree to 
which rconservative and rliberal differ within each study. We assigned positive rdifference values to 
indicate that rconservative was greater than rliberal in a given study (and negative rdifference values to 
indicate that rliberal was greater than rconservative) in line with the asymmetry hypothesis described 
above. All aggregate r effect sizes were computed with Comprehensive Meta-Analysis 3.0, 
which converts r effect sizes to Fisher z-values, and were analyzed using random-effects models. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
than would a participant beginning the study supporting capital punishment, simply because the two individuals 
began with different attitudes. Thus, a study that led both participants to update their attitudes about capital 
punishment to the same degree (i.e., no bias) would still leave the capital punishment opponent with more/stronger 
negative beliefs in total than the capital punishment supporter, simply because the former began the study with 
more/stronger negative beliefs than the latter.  For a similar but more technical treatment of the rationality of 
Bayesian updating in the context of political judgment, see Kahan (2016).!2!If studies did not dichotomize ideological groups, then we divided the groups above and below the scale midpoint.  !
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Moderator Analyses 
Because of the relatively modest number of studies included in our analysis, we limited our 
examination of potential moderators to five. The moderators we chose to examine were three 
common methodological variations found in existing studies (the nature of the manipulation, the 
nature of the dependent measure, and the nature of the sample) and two additional variables we 
suspected might moderate the magnitude of partisan bias effects. At least two members of our 
research team coded each study for each moderator.   
Political congeniality manipulation. We coded for whether the manipulation of political 
information entailed varying the content or the source of the stimuli being evaluated. For 
instance, Lord et al. (1979) manipulated the content of the political information by showing 
participants evidence that either supported or challenged the effectiveness of capital punishment. 
Cohen (2003) manipulated the source of political information when he showed participants the 
same welfare policy but varied whether that policy was endorsed by Congressional Democrats or 
Congressional Republicans. 
Political orientation measure. Measures of political orientation were coded for whether 
they were based on liberal-conservative ideology, Democratic-Republican party affiliation, or 
liberal-conservative position on an issue-specific attitude.  
Sample. We coded for whether the sample was drawn from a student population, a 
convenience sample of adults online, or a nationally representative sample. 
Type of information. We coded for whether the information was presented in the form of 
scientific data (e.g., Lord et al, 1979) or non-scientific information such as a description of a 
specific policy (e.g., Cohen, 2003) or the behavior of a political actor (e.g., Crawford, 2012).  
Political topic. We coded for the specific topic represented in the political congeniality 
manipulation. Among the 51 studies, six political topics were used in three or more studies 
allowing us to aggregate and compare their results: capital punishment (k = 6), presidential 
behavior3 (k = 5), welfare policy (k = 4), environmental policy (k = 4), abortion (k = 3), and gun 
control (k = 3).4  
Results 
Table 1 presents mean effect sizes for overall partisan bias (roverall), partisan bias separately 
for liberals and conservatives (rliberal, rconservative), and the relative magnitude of liberal and 
conservative partisan bias (rdifference) for all 51 studies. Table 1 also shows how each study was 
coded on the five moderator variables.  
The size of overall partisan bias ranged from rs = .001 to .696; thus some studies showed 
very little partisan bias and others showed a great deal of bias. There was also a substantial range !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 These are studies that described the behavior of a U.S. President (e.g., approval of electronic surveillance measure; 
Christenson & Kliner, 2016) and manipulated whether the President was a Democrat or a Republican.   
 4!For moderator analyses involving political topic, we calculated separate rs for each topic whether topic was 
manipulated between or within subjects. If topic was manipulated within subjects, the effect size for only one topic 
per sample was used in moderator analyses so that responses from the same participants would not contribute to 
multiple effect sizes.  !
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of effect sizes for rliberal, rconservative, and rdifference, indicating that studies ranged from showing 
substantially greater bias for liberals than conservatives to showing substantially greater bias for 
conservatives than liberals. 
Table 2 displays aggregated r effect size analyses for the main hypotheses with random-
effects models. There was a statistically significant small-to-medium size mean effect for overall 
partisan bias (roverall = .245, p < .001; CI = .208 to .280) suggesting that people in general 
showed a clear tendency to evaluate politically-congenial stimuli more favorably than similarly 
structured politically-uncongenial stimuli.  
The average effect sizes for rliberal and rconservative differed significantly from zero, indicating 
that liberal and conservative participants were both biased in favor of information that supported 
their particular political beliefs and allegiances. Providing support for the symmetry hypothesis, 
the mean levels of liberal and conservative bias were very similar in magnitude (rliberal = .235; CI 
= .192 to .296; rconservative = .255; CI = .205 to .304) and the aggregate rdifference effect size across 
all 51 studies was extremely small and not significantly different from zero (rdifference =.009, p 
= .55; CI = -.020 to .038; see Table 2), indicating no difference in degree of bias between liberals 
and conservatives. In other words, whether partisan bias was aggregated separately for liberals 
and conservatives, or compared within each study and then aggregated, our results suggest that 
liberals and conservatives were both significantly biased in favor of information that supported 
their ideological beliefs and groups, and to very similar degrees.!
Moderator Analyses 
There was significant heterogeneity within roverall and rdifference effect sizes (see QW tests for 
homogeneity in Table 2), so we tested whether any of our coded variables moderated our main 
findings. These moderator analyses should be interpreted cautiously, however, because the 
relatively small number of studies examined in subgroups creates the possibility of confounding 
among the moderators (e.g., many of the studies examining a particular political topic may also 
rely on a particular methodological approach).  
Overall, none of our analyses reveal statistically significant differences for any of our 
moderator variables for either overall magnitude of partisan bias (roverall), magnitude of bias in 
liberals and conservatives separately (rliberal, rconservative), or the relative magnitude of bias in 
liberals and conservatives (rdifference). Importantly, the overall partisan bias effect was significant 
for every subgroup for all five moderator variables examined. All statistics for the moderator 
analyses are reported in Table 3.  
Although we did not find any significant moderators in our analysis, the prediction intervals 
associated with our mean effect sizes (presented in Table 2) suggest that the true effects of 
partisan bias -- for liberals, for conservatives, and for both groups combined -- are likely to vary 
widely from study to study, such that true effects range from non-existent (very close to zero) to 
fairly large. Furthermore, the true effects for the difference between conservatives and liberals 
are also likely to vary, ranging from liberals being slightly more biased than conservatives to 
conservatives being slightly more biased than liberals. These wide prediction intervals 
underscore the fact that moderators of these effects are likely to exist, even though we were not 
able to identify these moderators in our study. 
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Publication bias 
We addressed the possibility of publication bias in multiple ways. First, we sought out and 
included both published (k = 42) and unpublished studies (k = 9) of partisan bias.  
Second, we looked at whether publication in a peer-reviewed source moderated effect size. 
Published studies showed a larger mean partisan bias effect size (roverall = .266, p<.001) than did 
unpublished studies (roverall =.139, p = .003; QB=6.35, p = .012), but the mean effect sizes in both 
sets of studies were significantly greater than zero. Our primary interest in this project, however, 
was not whether overall bias exists, but rather the relative magnitude of bias in conservatives and 
liberals. In this case, publication status did not moderate results. Conservatives and liberals were 
equally biased in published (rdifference = -.001, p = .95) and unpublished studies (rdifference = .054, 
p = .11; QB = 2.15, p = .14).  
Third, we used funnel plots to visually assess publication bias by plotting Fisher’s 
transformation of the effect size for each study on the horizontal axis against the natural log of its 
sample size on the vertical axis, and used linear regression to test the slope through the points in 
the funnel plot (Sterne, Becker, & Egger, 2005). Symmetrical funnel plots with a non-significant 
slope indicate that publication bias is not an issue. Asymmetry in the funnel plot with a negative 
slope indicates publication bias because studies with small sample sizes showing null or negative 
effects are absent from the sample of studies. There was no evidence of publication bias for 
either overall partisan bias, (roverall β = -.12, p = .42) or the relative degree of bias in 
conservatives and liberals (rdiff β = -.01, p = .97).  
Discussion 
The clearest finding from this meta-analysis was the robustness of partisan bias. A tendency 
to find otherwise identical information more valid and compelling when it confirms rather than 
challenges one’s political affinities was found across a wide range of studies using different 
kinds of samples, different operationalizations of political orientation and political congeniality, 
and across multiple political topics. The mean effect for overall partisan bias was modest in size, 
but statistically significant partisan bias effects were found in 39 out of 51 samples and in every 
subgroup compared in our moderator analyses. That is, the tendency to evaluate politically-
congenial information more charitably than politically uncongenial information was found 
whether the study manipulated congeniality via the source of the information or its content, 
whether political orientation was operationalized as ideology, party affiliation or a specific 
attitude about a particular political issue, whether the sample was composed of students, adults 
opting into an online study or a representative sample of US citizens, whether the information 
evaluated was scientific or nonscientific, and across a several different politically-charged topics.  
None of this should be surprising given the extensive body of research confirming a pervasive 
human tendency toward motivated reasoning and self and group enhancement (Brown & 
Kobayashi, 2002; Kunda, 1990; Mercier & Sperber, 2011; Sedikides, Gaertner, & Vevea, 2005). 
People are less skeptical consumers of information they want to believe than of information they 
do not want to believe (Ditto & Lopez, 1992), and this pattern is as evident in the political realm 
as it is in other realms of life that evoke strong emotions, preferences and social allegiances.  
The Question of Ideological Symmetry 
A corollary of the general robustness of partisan bias was specific support for the symmetry 
hypothesis. Our meta-analysis contributes to a longstanding and ongoing debate regarding the 
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psychological similarities and differences between individuals occupying the left and right ends 
of the ideological spectrum (Adorno et al., 1950; Brandt et al., 2014; Crawford, 2017; Jost et al., 
2003; Jost, 2017; Rokeach, 1956). Contrary to the view that political conservatives are 
particularly prone to defensiveness and cognitive rigidity (Adorno et al., 1950; Jost et al., 2003), 
our analysis found that when partisan bias was aggregated across studies, topics, and 
methodological details, both liberals and conservatives were biased in favor of information that 
confirmed their political beliefs, and to a very similar degree.  
Given the pervasiveness of motivated reasoning and the strong tribal animosities between left 
and right that have long characterized American politics, it might seem odd to expect individuals 
on one side of the political divide to be substantially more evenhanded in their judgments than 
the other. And yet, there is a large and growing body of literature, including considerable 
experimental work, associating political conservatism with a broad array of motivational 
orientations suggestive of cognitive rigidity and resistance to negative or threatening information 
(Hibbing et al., 2014; Jost, 2017). This work is compelling, but it is important to note that these 
studies focus their comparisons on individual differences in general motivational proclivities, 
whereas our meta-analysis examined specific judgment outcomes. As such, the two sets of 
studies do not directly contradict each other, but the question clearly arises as to why the 
differential motivational tendencies of liberals and conservatives documented in past research 
were not found to manifest themselves in differential susceptibility to partisan bias in our meta-
analysis. 
One possibility is that the asymmetrical psychological propensities of liberals and 
conservatives have their primary impact not on susceptibility to bias in general, but rather on 
which topics the two groups are likely to be biased about (Brandt et al., 2014; Crawford, 2012; 
2014). Greater commitment to attitude positions is associated with more selective processing and 
resistance to persuasion (Krosnick 1988; Pomerantz et al., 1995; Zuwerink & Devine, 1996), and 
moral commitments may be particularly potent in rousing psychological defenses (Mullen & 
Skitka, 2006l; Skitka, Bauman & Sargis, 2005). By this account, conservatives’ heightened 
discomfort with uncertainty and threat might reveal itself, not in more biased processing of 
information about any political topic, but rather in relatively pronounced bias about information 
that threatens or assuages those or other particularly conservative concerns. A recent study, for 
example, found political conservatism to be associated with greater credulity to information 
about personal or societal risks (e.g., attacks by terrorists or sharks) but not personal or societal 
benefits (e.g., the health advantages of carrots or cats; Fessler, Pisor & Holbrook, 2017). 
Analogously, liberals by this account might be expected to show particularly biased responses to 
information bearing on their core concerns about protection for vulnerable groups and societal 
inequality. Uhlmann, Pizarro, Tannenbaum, and Ditto (2009) found political conservatives to be 
unaffected by the race of an individual to be sacrificed in a moral dilemma, whereas liberals did 
discriminate based on race: liberals were significantly less likely to sacrifice an individual with a 
stereotypically African-American name than a stereotypically White name (see Norton, Vandello, 
& Darley, 2004 for similar findings).5 Our meta-analysis found only non-significant differences !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!5!Also relevant here is another study reported by Uhlmann et al (2009) examining judgments about the morality of 
civilian collateral damage caused by the actions of either the American or the Iraqi military. In this case, the 
judgments of political liberals were unaffected by the nationality of the perpetrators whereas conservatives were 
significantly more forgiving when American actions led to unintended civilian deaths than when Iraqi actions did.  !
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in bias across political topics, but future research with greater statistical power and topics chosen 
to map onto the known psychological and moral sensitivities of liberals and conservatives (e.g., 
Graham et al, 2013; Jost et al., 2003) would be a more compelling test of the topic-specific bias 
hypothesis. 
Another possibility is that the psychological differences between liberals and conservatives 
have their effects on aspects of the information processing sequence other than the biased 
evaluation of political information. The studies examined in our meta-analysis all confronted 
participants with information that either supported or challenged their political beliefs, a “strong 
situation” (Mischel, 1977) likely to evoke motivated responding in most or all people, and one 
that precludes the choice generally available in the natural environment to direct one’s attention 
toward or away from particular kinds of information. It is possible then that it is the choice of 
what information to seek out or avoid where conservative’s relative reticence toward novel and 
threatening information has it effects, rather than how that information is processed once it is 
confronted. Research in the selective exposure tradition has produced several studies suggesting 
that the tendency to preferentially seek out information that supports rather than challenges 
political views is more pronounced in conservatives than liberals (Barberá, Jost, Nagler, Tucker, 
& Bonneau, 2015; Messing & Westwood, 2012; Nam, Jost, & van Bavel, 2013; Rodriguez, 
Moskowitz, Salem & Ditto, 2017). It is also true, however, that several studies have revealed no 
political differences in selective exposure tendencies (Collins, Crawford & Brandt, 2017; Frimer, 
Skitka, & Motyl, 2017; Iyengar & Hahn, 2009; Stroud, 2008) and a few have suggested greater 
selective exposure among liberals than conservatives (Bakshy, Messing, & Adamic, 2015; 
Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng, 2009). Much like the pattern seen in our meta-analysis, the 
literature on selective exposure reveals considerable variability across studies in the relative 
magnitude of bias in liberals and conservatives, with the clearest conclusion to be drawn from 
the extant data being the proneness of both sides to favor politically-congenial over politically-
uncongenial information. Research on political selective exposure, however, is a step ahead of 
work on the biased processing of political information in its recognition of important boundary 
conditions and contextual influences on political bias such as information utility and attitude 
importance (Garrett & Stroud, 2014; Klobloch-Westerwick & Kleinman, 2012; Knobloch-
Westerwick & Meng, 2009). Similar contextual factors have been found to moderate motivated 
reasoning processes outside of the political domain (Kunda, 1990; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; 
Neuberg & Fiske, 1987), and exploring their operation in political motivated reasoning has the 
potential to clarify predictions regarding when and in whom partisan bias is most likely to be 
found, including variability over time and political climate.  
Of course, further research is needed to thoroughly investigate all of the speculation above. 
This research would ideally include new experimental studies (e.g., comparing the magnitude of 
partisan bias across topics that differ in attitude importance or moral conviction for liberals and 
conservatives), longitudinal studies (where data are available) to track changes in political 
congeniality biases over time and historical context, as well as additional meta-analyses (e.g., 
comparing selective exposure tendencies in liberals and conservatives). The swelling body of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
This fits well with data showing that conservatives place greater moral value on loyalty and patriotism than do 
liberals (Graham et al., 2012).  !
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research examining the psychological underpinnings of liberalism and conservatism should be 
particularly helpful in generating testable hypotheses.  
Finally, there are almost certainly important symmetries, as well as important asymmetries, 
between liberal and conservative psychology (Jost, 2017), and research exploring this 
complicated web of commonality is inaptly characterized as pursuing “Swiss-style neutrality” or 
some kind of false moral equivalency between liberal and conservative ideology. Different 
psychological processes contribute to different manifestations of bias, and there are complexities 
to political ideology that belie the simple unidimensional (liberal-conservative) characterization 
relied on here (e.g., Crawford, Jussim, Cain, & Cohen, 2013; Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto, & 
Haidt, 2012; Malka & Soto, 2015). All this complexity must be considered in any comprehensive 
treatment of the ideological symmetry question, and given that complexity, a simple portrait of 
the psychological superiority of one ideology over another seems unlikely to emerge. Moreover, 
psychological comparisons are completely independent of, and in no way preclude, thoughtful 
assessments of the superiority or inferiority of political ideologies at a social, economic, or moral 
level. Psychological equivalency does not imply moral equivalency, despite a fundamental 
human tendency to conflate descriptive evaluations with prescriptive ones (Ditto & Liu, 2016; 
Hume, 1740/1985; Liu & Ditto, 2013). Political psychologists, ourselves included, face a unique 
challenge, highlighted ironically by the findings of pervasive partisan bias presented here, to 
prevent our own political views from influencing how we conduct and interpret our research. We 
agree with Jost (2017) that a preference for finding commonalities between ideologies is no less 
problematic than a preference for showing one particular ideology to be psychologically (or 
morally) superior to others, and encourage all researchers interested in partisan bias to take every 
precaution to avoid falling prey to the very phenomenon we seek to understand.   
Limitations 
Our meta-analysis was more targeted than some because of our desire to focus on studies that 
provide the most compelling evidence for partisan bias: experimental studies using a matched 
information design to examine differential evaluation of politically-congenial and politically-
uncongenial information (Kahan, 2016). We could have cast our net more broadly to include 
studies using correlational data or other experimental designs, or examining other kinds of 
partisan biases (e.g., selective exposure, hostile media bias). Instead, we felt that given the long-
established difficulties of disentangling motivated bias from normative decision processes (Ditto, 
2009; Kahan, 2016; Tetlock & Levi, 1982), focusing on only the highest quality studies as a first 
step would provide the most accurate and most conservative yardstick to compare bias across 
groups.  
This does not mean, however, that bias is always the sole explanation for differences found 
in studies with carefully matched stimulus materials. For example, several studies included in 
our meta-analysis demonstrate significant differences in how positively an identical policy was 
evaluated, even when the only difference between conditions was a single word indicating 
whether one’s own party endorsed that policy or the opposing party did (e.g., Malka & Lelkes, 
2010). At one level this can be construed as bias: a person favors the very same policy that they 
would have rejected if only the other party had proposed it. But party labels can also be thought 
of as cues, and favoring a policy supported by people one agrees with on many other issues can 
be thought of as a sensible heuristic strategy rather than a bias (Bullock, 2011; Leeper & 
Slothuus, 2014).  
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 This interpretational ambiguity, of course, is just one example of the formidable challenge of 
ruling out normative counter-explanation that transcends the study of bias in political judgment. 
In our meta-analysis, studies that manipulate the political content of information rather than its 
source are (arguably) less vulnerable to this ambiguity, and our analysis shows the mean effect of 
partisan bias to be equally strong in the former (r = .236) as in the latter (r = .251). But 
ultimately, there is an empirical catch-22 at the heart of all research on motivated reasoning. 
Because contextual information must be manipulated to produce differential motivations to 
accept or reject a given piece of target information, the informational differences between 
conditions that are a necessary part of the motivational manipulation are always a potential cause 
of any differential judgments between those same conditions. As long as information is used to 
manipulate motivation, the entanglement between the two (and the potential confounding that 
inevitably results) will always persist, at least to some degree. Minimizing the plausibility of 
normative explanations for putative bias effects is important in scientific research, and restricting 
our meta-analysis to only the most carefully designed experiments was our attempt to do that 
here. But it is important to recognize that in the real world of politics, as in virtually every real 
world situation, prior belief and motivated bias are naturally confounded (Ditto, Munro, 
Apanovich, Scepansky, & Lockhart, 2003) and both likely play a role in partisan resistance to 
politically challenging information. When confronted with the latest Republican tax reform plan, 
for example, most Democrats approach that plan both expecting it to be bad policy (based on 
prior information they have been exposed to about the ineffectiveness of tax cuts, almost 
certainly shaped by selective exposure tendencies) and motivated to perceive it as bad policy, 
either because aspects of the policy offend their moral sensitivities or because of their general 
antipathy toward the Republicans who proposed it. This natural coalition of belief and 
motivation may help to explain why the bias we observe under tightly controlled experimental 
conditions seems so subtle compared to the seemingly blatant hypocrisy people often perceive in 
their real world political antagonists. 
Another key limitation of our study was our decision to treat political orientation 
dichotomously rather than continuously. This decision flowed primarily from our focus on 
matched information designs in which political congeniality was defined by whether information 
confirms or challenges participants’ existing political views or allegiances, making the inclusion 
of individuals with moderate or politically-independent views in continuous analyses 
problematic. Included studies also used varied operationalizations of left versus right ideology, 
many measuring or reporting it only dichotomously, so adopting a dichotomous approach 
allowed us to include the maximum number of studies in our analyses. Still, our approach of 
comparing the magnitude of liberal and conservative bias in reactions to information 
manipulated to either challenge or support partisan beliefs raises important issues about the 
equivalency of stimulus materials across experimental conditions (see supplemental analyses for 
examination of one such issue) as well as the extent to which our liberal and conservative 
samples were equally extreme in their ideological commitments. Future work should consider 
how to best gauge bias across the continuous spectrum of ideology, most critically for the ability 
to evaluate what is likely to be an important role for ideological extremity in fomenting partisan 
bias.   
Finally, it is important to consider whether the political views of researchers may have 
influenced the sample of studies available for our meta-analysis, especially in a field so 
disproportionally composed of individuals whose sympathies lie with one particular political 
perspective (Inbar & Lammers, 2012). In most meta-analyses, the file drawer problem is a 
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straightforward matter of gauging the extent to which null results are underrepresented in the 
published data. The current case is more complicated in that a) our primary result of interest is a 
null finding (no difference in magnitude of bias between liberals and conservatives) and b) it is 
plausible to consider whether a particular pattern of affirmative results–those showing strong 
liberal bias–might be underrepresented in the literature as well. First, we made active attempts to 
uncover and include data from unpublished sources and moderator analyses comparing the 
relative effect size of conservative and liberal bias in published and unpublished studies revealed 
no significant differences. Second, suppression of evidence of liberal bias (either active or 
passive) seems unlikely in that very few of the studies included in our meta-analysis were 
specifically focused on comparing the magnitude of liberal and conservative bias, with most not 
even reporting the relevant data or comparisons. Still, we should note again that although we can 
find no evidence that the strength of liberal bias was underestimated in the current study, 
research on partisan bias is naturally fraught with the potential for that same partisan bias to 
influence the research process at multiple levels, from study design and construction of stimulus 
materials to the analysis and reporting of relevant data. New methods being promoted to enhance 
the reproducibility of empirical findings in the field of psychology (e.g., Cumming, 2014; 
Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011) should help combat all forms of research bias, including 
those flowing from researchers’ political commitments (Ditto, Wojcik, Chen, Grady, & Ringel, 
2015).  
Conclusion 
It is common in political discourse to hear politicians and pundits contrast the biased 
opinions of their political opponents with their own side’s impartial view of the facts. Our meta-
analysis suggests instead that partisan bias is a bipartisan problem, and that we may simply 
recognize bias in others better than we see it in ourselves (Pronin, 2007). This same myopia 
toward our own side’s biases may also help explain why a field dominated by liberal researchers 
has been so much more focused on the biased perceptions of the political right than the political 
left. This meta-analysis raised more questions than it answered in terms of the specific 
determinants of partisan bias, and future research may suggest that our assessment of the 
magnitude of bias in each side may be imprecise (see the confidence and prediction intervals in 
Table 2) or historically variable. What is most clear from the data, however, is that both liberals 
and conservatives show a consistent tendency to be less skeptical consumers of information that 
supports than challenges their political beliefs. The fact that neither side is immune to partisan 
bias may be the more important point than whether one side falls prey to it slightly more than the 
other. 
Using different standards to evaluate information when it supports your political views than 
when it challenges them represents an obvious problem in terms of normative standards of 
judgment. Still, it can be argued that in terms of individual self-interest, a tendency to adjust 
one’s political views to fit with norms of important social or cultural groups makes good sense 
(Kahan, 2013; Kahan et al., 2012). But partisan bias represents a practical problem as well. It is 
increasingly clear in contemporary American politics that liberals and conservatives often hold 
dramatically different factual beliefs relevant to key political issues (Frankovic, 2016; Rampell, 
2016). The processing biases documented in our meta-analysis, particularly in conjunction with 
partisan selective exposure effects, are likely an important contributor to these “alternative facts” 
by leading political partisans to more readily accept “facts” that support their side’s positions 
rather than refute them. These differences in factual belief can in turn contribute to political 
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conflict and governmental dysfunction by making compromise and negotiation more difficult 
and fueling corrosive political stereotypes of the other side as deluded, hypocritical, or just plain 
dumb (Ditto & Liu, 2016; Kennedy & Pronin, 2008).  
One solution many in the academy might suggest is the provision of clear scientific data to 
provide impartial answers to disputed questions of fact, and to use as a foundation for evidence-
based policy prescriptions. Our data, however, present a potential obstacle for this proposed 
solution as our moderator analyses revealed that political partisans responded to information 
composed of scientific data in just as biased a fashion as they did to non-scientific arguments. 
Rather than being the final arbiter of truth--the impartial political referee that many people seem 
to crave--empirical data may simply provide “grist for a motivated cognitive mill” (Ditto & 
Lopez, 1992, p. 579; Kahan et al., 2012). Together with a growing body of evidence suggesting 
that increased knowledge and expertise in a topic area exacerbates rather than ameliorates 
political bias (Kahan et al., 2012; Liu & Ditto, 2013; Taber & Lodge, 2006), the prognosis for 
eradicating partisan bias with harder data and better education does not seem particularly rosy.6  
Sophisticated strategies, informed by psychological science, need to be developed to combat 
our political prejudices (e.g., Feinberg & Willer, 2013; Fernbach, Rogers, Fox, & Sloman, 2013) 
and begin to build a less polarized, more civil, and more evidence-based political culture. The 
evidence available right now, both scientific and anecdotal, suggests that this will not be easy. 
But a crucial first step is to recognize our collective vulnerability to perceiving the world in ways 
that validate our political affinities.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 These findings also suggest another testable explanation for why the motivational differences between liberals and 
conservatives do not produce differential patterns of partisan bias. Liberal’s relative tendency to engage is effortful, 
system 2 thinking (reflected in their higher scores on measures of integrative complexity, cognitive reflection, and 
need for cognition; Jost, 2017) may offer them little protection from (and perhaps even some vulnerability to) biased 
political judgment (Kahan, 2013; 2016).  
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Table 1. Effect size estimates and study characteristics for all studies  
Study roverall (N) rdifference 
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(N) 
rconservative 
(N) 
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orientation 
Manipulation 
type Sample Topic 
Information 
type 
Bolsen et al. (2014) .361c 
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.042 .326b 
(81) 
.400c  
(72) 
Party Source Representative Environmental 
- general 
Non-
scientific 
Bergan (2012) .094 
(110) 
-.268b .338b 
(59) 
-.203  
(51) 
Party Source Students Abortion Non-
scientific 
Bullock (2011) .290c 
(1633) 
.184c .106b 
(803) 
.449c 
(830) 
Party Source Representative Healthcare Non-
scientific 
Claassen & Ensley 
(2016) 
.194c 
(549) 
.031 .167b 
(297) 
.227c 
(252) 
Party Source Representative Campaign 
tricks 
Non-
scientific 
Christenson & Kriner 
(2017) 
.384c 
(354) 
.042 .351c 
(195) 
.423c 
(159) 
Party Source Representative Presidential 
behavior 
Non-
scientific 
Ciuk & Yost (2016) .271a 
(77) 
.009 .263 
(39) 
.280  
(38) 
Party Source Adults from 
community 
Environmental 
- general 
Non-
scientific 
Cohen (2013) .696c 
(79) 
.009 .692c 
(48) 
.702c  
(31) 
Ideology Source Students Welfare Non-
scientific 
Crawford & Xhambazi 
(2015) 
.254b 
(163) 
-.005 .260b 
(115) 
.248  
(48) 
Ideology Source Adults/online Protest Non-
scientific 
Crawford (2012) .418c 
(161) 
-.112 .479c 
(110) 
.268  
(51) 
Ideology Source Adults/online Presidential 
behavior 
Non-
scientific 
Crawford et al. (2013) .292c 
(211) 
-.380c .536c 
(134) 
-.201  
(77) 
Ideology Content Students and 
adults 
Multiple 
social policies 
Scientific 
Crawford et al. (2014) .126 
(157) 
-.149 .205a 
(121) 
-.159 (36) Ideology Source Adults/online Presidential 
behavior 
Non-
scientific 
Crawford et al. (2015) 
Sample 1 
.254b 
(153) 
.009 .249b 
(112) 
.268  
(41) 
Ideology Source Adults/online Multiple 
social policies 
Non-
scientific 
Crawford et al. (2015) 
Sample 2 
.181a 
(162) 
-.029 .197a 
(121) 
.130 (41) Ideology Source Adults/online Multiple 
social policies 
Non-
scientific 
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Druckman (2001) .419c 
(239) 
.001 .419c 
(149) 
.420c (90) Party Source Students Asian disease 
scenario 
Non-
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Furgeson et al. (2008a) .145 
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.092 .085 
(80) 
.286 (34) Composite Content Law students Constitution 
interpretation 
Non-
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Furgeson et al. (2008b) .241c 
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.014 .234b 
(209) 
.266a (61) Composite Content Students Tax policy Non-
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Groenendyk (2013) .001 
(161) 
-.070 .065 
(88) 
-.078 (73) Party Source Representative Outsourcing Non-
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Hawkins & Nosek 
(2012) Study 1 
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(895) 
-.014 .218c 
(592) 
.189b 
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Party Source Adults/online Welfare Non-
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Hawkins & Nosek 
(2012) Study 2 
.245c 
(928) 
.030 .229c 
(590) 
.274c 
(338) 
Party Source Adults/online Education 
policy 
Non-
scientific 
Kahan (2013) .239c 
(1062) 
-.014 .253c 
(550) 
.225c 
(512) 
Composite Content Representative Global 
warming 
Non-
scientific 
Kahan et al. (2016) .162c 
(723) 
.084a .078 
(362) 
.243c 
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Composite Source Representative Multiple 
topics 
Non-
scientific 
Kahan et al. (2011) .339c 
(1466) 
.035 .307c 
(736) 
.370c 
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Composite Content Representative Multiple 
social policies 
Scientific 
Kahan et al. (2012) .366c 
(200) 
.015 .353c 
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.380c (98) Composite Source Representative Protest Non-
scientific 
Kahan et al. (2013) .212c 
(397) 
.146b .072 
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.352c 
(193) 
Composite Content Representative Gun control Scientific 
Kahan et al. (2017) .116c 
(1391) 
.092c .026 
(714) 
.208c 
(677) 
Composite Content Adults/online Zika virus Non-
scientific 
Kam (2005) .302c 
(166) 
.085 .248b 
(112) 
.412b        
(54) 
Party Source Students Food 
irradation 
policy 
Non-
scientific 
Kopko et al. (2011) .041 
(100) 
.001 .042   
(60) 
.040 (40) Party Source Students Ballots Non-
scientific 
Lai & Nosek 
(unpublished) 
.096a 
(545) 
.039 .065 
(334) 
.144a 
(211) 
Party Source Adults/online Education 
policy 
Non-
scientific 
BIAS IS BIPARTISAN                
         29 
 
Liu (unpublished) 
Study 1 
.245c 
(381) 
.074 .220c 
(335) 
.428b (46) Ideology Content Adults/online Abstinence Scientific 
Liu (unpublished) 
Study 2 
.170c 
(433) 
-.065 .120a 
(363) 
.021 (70) Ideology Content Adults/online Capital 
punishment 
Scientific 
Liu (unpublished) 
Study 3 
.366c 
(537) 
.100a .325c 
(440) 
.538c (97) Ideology Content Adults/online Gun control Scientific 
Lopez (1994) Study 1 .116 
(126) 
.210a -.105 
(61) 
.314a (65) Issue attitude Content Students Capital 
punishment 
Scientific 
Lopez (1994) Study 2 .076 
(47) 
.420b -.310 
(26) 
.526a (21) Issue attitude Content Students Capital 
punishment 
Scientific 
Lord et al. (1979) .643c 
(48) 
.176 .518   
(24) 
.740c (24) Issue attitude Content Students Capital 
punishment 
Scientific 
MacCoun & Paletz 
(2009) Sample 1 
.012 
(156) 
-.260c .270a 
(78) 
-.248a (78) Ideology Content Representative Gun control Scientific 
MacCoun & Paletz 
(2009) Sample 2 
.290c 
(148) 
-.120 .409c 
(67) 
.186 (81) Ideology Content Representative Capital 
punishment 
Scientific 
MacCoun & Paletz 
(2009) Sample 3 
.562c 
(134) 
.060 .518c 
(61) 
.596c (73) Ideology Content Representative Medical 
marijuana 
Scientific 
MacCoun & Paletz 
(2009) Sample 4 
.237c 
(171) 
.074 .175   
(97) 
.317b (74) Ideology Content Representative Education 
policy 
Scientific 
Malka & Lelkes (2010) .233c 
(322) 
.008 .224b 
(134) 
.240b 
(188) 
Ideology Source Representative Farm 
subsidies 
Non-
scientific 
Mullinix (2016) .495c 
(759) 
-.065 .541c 
(399) 
.441c 
(360) 
Party Source Representative Multiple 
social policies 
Non-
scientific 
Munro & Munro 
(2014) 
.080 
(106) 
.083 .009 
(62) 
.181 (44) Party Content Students Scientific 
evidence 
Scientific 
Nawara (2011) .019 
(158) 
.032 -.008 
(94) 
.059 (64) Party Source Students Presidential 
behavior 
Non-
scientific 
Scurich & Shniderman 
(2014) Study 1 
.223a 
(125) 
-.129 .359b 
(56) 
.108 (69) Issue attitude Content Adults/online Capital 
punishment 
Scientific 
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Scurich & Shniderman 
(2014) Study 2 
.349c 
(128) 
.078 .300b 
(87) 
.448b (41) Issue attitude Content Adults/online Abortion Scientific 
Smith (unpublished) .042 
(179) 
.001 .041 
(124) 
.043 (57) Party Source Adults/online NSA policy Non-
scientific 
Smith et al. (2012) 
Study 1 
.238c 
(559) 
-.009 .244c 
(374) 
.226b 
(185) 
Party Source Adults/online Welfare Non-
scientific 
Smith et al. (2012) 
Study 2 
.209c 
(509) 
.042 .190c 
(410) 
.290b (99) Party Source Adults/online Welfare Non-
scientific 
Tannenbaum et al. 
(2014) Study 1 
.104b 
(238) 
-.009 .109 
(172) 
.088 (66) Ideology Source Adults/online Public policy Non-
scientific 
Tannenbaum et al. 
(2014) Study 2 
.147b 
(366) 
-.095 .210b 
(249) 
.007 (117) Ideology Content Adults/online Public policy Non-
scientific 
Tannenbaum et al. 
(2014) Study 3 
.199 
(88) 
.035 .169   
(50) 
.240 (38) Ideology Content Bureaucrats Public policy Non-
scientific 
Tannenbaum et al. 
(2014) Study 4 
.389a 
(30) 
-.048 .451   
(11) 
.356 (19) Ideology Content U.S. Mayors Public policy Non-
scientific 
Note. Positive roverall values indicate greater bias; positive rdifference values indicate conservatives show more bias than liberals. 
a p<.05, b p<.01, c p<.001 
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Table 2. Mean effect size estimates across all studies for overall partisan bias, difference in partisan bias between liberals and conservatives, 
liberal partisan bias, and conservative partisan bias 
    Random effects model   
Homogeneity 
among studies 
  k r CI Lower CI Upper PI Lower PI Upper 
 
QW(50) T (tau) 
Overall partisan bias (roverall ) 51 .245* .208 .280 0.003 0.486 
  
307.96* 0.120 
Partisan bias for liberals (rliberal ) 51 .235* .192 .276 -0.038 0.508 
 
244.70* 0.136 
Partisan bias for conservatives 
(rconservative ) 
51 .255* .205 .304 -0.059 0.569 
 
224.33* 0.156 
Difference in bias between 
conservatives and liberals (rdifference) 
51 .009 -.020 .038 -0.175 0.175 
 
100.41* 0.083 
Note. Positive roverall, rliberal, and rconservative values indicate participants demonstrate bias, positive rdifference values indicate conservatives are more 
biased than liberals. Table reports 95% confidence interval (CI) and 95% prediction interval (PI) for mean effect sizes. 
* p<.001 
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Table 3. Moderator Analyses for Partisan Bias Effect Size Estimates 
  Overall partisan bias  
Difference in bias 
between conservatives 
and liberals   
  k roverall QB p   rdifference QB p rliberal rconservative 
Political orientation  
 
1.387 .500 
 
 5.464 .065 
  Issue attitude 5 .289**   
 
.136   .168 .421*** 
Party 19 .222***   
 
.017   .212*** .243*** 
Ideology 19 .271***   
 
-.048   .297*** .221*** 
Manipulation type   0.168 .682 
 
 0.061 .805   
Source 27 .251***   
 
.007   .246*** .253*** 
Content 24 .236***   
 
.015   .221*** .259*** 
Sample   3.773 .152 
 
 1.346 .510   
Representative 16 .281***   
 
.021   .263*** .300*** 
Students 12 .251***   
 
.052   .197** .314*** 
Online 19 .208***   
 
.006   .208*** .207*** 
Topic   2.233 .816 
 
 3.414 .636   
Capital punishment 6 .248***   
 
.056   .196† .300** 
Presidential 
behavior 
5 .285***   
 
-.018   .298*** .254** 
Welfare 4 .324***   
 
.002   .298*** .316*** 
Environmental 4 .334***   
 
.034   .310*** .362*** 
Abortion 3 .192**   
 
-.052   .226** .137 
Gun control 3 .210*   
 
.005   .225* .238 
Scientific   0.706 .401 
 
 0.030 .862   
Not scientific 35 .235*** 
 
 
 
.010 
 
 .226*** .241*** 
Scientific 16 .268*** 
 
   .017 
 
 .256*** .297*** 
Note. Results are for random-effect moderator analyses. Positive roverall values indicate greater overall 
partisan bias; positive rdifference values indicate conservatives show more bias than liberals. Moderator 
analyses were performed on roverall and rdifference, but liberal and conservative partisan bias (rliberal and 
rconservative) are also shown for reference. 
† p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
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Figure 1. Democrat and Republican participants’ perceptions of the “average Democrat” and 
“average Republican” as biased. Values represent Ms and SEs, N = 951. The interaction between 
participant’s party identification and target of judgment was significant (F(1,949)=525.65, 
p<.001, η2=.34). 
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Supplemental Analyses 
Our meta-analysis relied exclusively on experimental studies that presented participants with 
information manipulated to support or challenge their political beliefs. Partisan bias was 
operationalized as the degree to which politically-congenial information was perceived as more 
valid than closely matched politically-uncongenial information. Although researchers are 
generally quite careful about equating the specific details of manipulated information across 
experimental conditions, a more subtle experimental challenge is equating the general 
believability of the liberal and conservative information the manipulated materials are designed 
to support or refute. Specifically, if information designed to be consistent with either liberal or 
conservative beliefs is more believable in general (i.e., to both liberals and conservatives), this 
could inflate the appearance of that side’s bias.  
To illustrate, compare the three panels of Supplemental Figure 1. Suppose a study was done 
presenting liberals and conservatives with carefully matched information suggesting that 
anthropogenic climate change was either real (supported by the data) or fake (not supported by 
the data) and participants rated the information’s quality. All three panels show the pattern we 
would expect to observe based on the results of our meta-analysis: political conservatives rate 
information challenging the reality of climate change as more valid than information supporting 
its reality, and liberals show the opposite pattern. In the left panel, there is no main effect for 
type of information. Although both sides favor information that supports their views on climate 
change over information that challenges those views, overall pro-climate change information is 
rated as just as valid as anti-climate change information, and liberals and conservatives show 
bias of the same magnitude (3 scale points on each side). But suppose that instead, people 
generally (that is, both liberals and conservatives) find one position on climate change as more 
plausible than the other, and thus are likely to find information consistent with that conclusion 
more believable than information challenging that conclusion. In the middle panel, we have 
added a main effect such that anti-climate change information is seen as more plausible than pro-
climate change information. Consequently, conservatives in that panel show a larger difference 
than liberals in their ratings of the two types of information (4 scale points vs. 2), thus appearing 
more biased. Similarly, in the right panel we added a main effect such that pro-climate change 
information is seen as generally more plausible than anti-climate change information. This 
results in the appearance of greater bias in liberals than conservatives. In sum, if in a particular 
study either liberal-friendly or conservative-friendly information is more believable overall, it 
can inflate the relative magnitude of the bias attributed to liberals and conservatives. 
As noted in the main text, the combined strategy of carefully matching the details of 
information across conditions and asking participants to rate the quality of the presented 
information (rather than the general plausibility of the conclusion) minimizes the possibility of 
such main effect differences in information believability. Still, to examine whether this issue 
might affect the interpretation of our results, we identified all studies (k = 30) for which we had 
the information to compute effect sizes for the main effect comparison between acceptance of 
liberal politically-congenial and conservative politically-congenial information. To calculate the 
believability of the liberal-consistent information, we averaged the Ms and SDs for evaluations of 
information consistent with liberal ideology (e.g., a study showing gun-control laws are 
effective). To calculate the believability of the conservative-consistent information, we averaged 
the Ms and SDs of evaluations for information consistent with conservative ideology (e.g., a 
study showing gun-control laws are ineffective). We used these averages to calculate an r effect 
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size of the degree to which conservative or liberal information was more believable in general, 
arbitrarily labeling positive values as conservative information being more believable. 
Using random effects analysis, we found no difference in believability between liberal-
friendly and conservative-friendly information (r = -.020, p = .430), which is consistent with 
panel 1 of Supplemental Figure 1. Looking across all 30 studies, information about the existence 
of climate change or the ineffectiveness of capital punishment was not considered any more valid 
or convincing than information disputing climate change or advocating the efficacy of capital 
punishment. Thus, it is unlikely that the degree of liberal and conservative partisan bias (rliberal 
and rconservative) is inflated or underestimated due to how believable or plausible liberal politically-
congenial information or conservative politically-congenial information is.   
Nevertheless, it is still important to be aware of the political perils of studying partisan bias, 
particularly when comparing its magnitude across the political spectrum. For instance, it is easy 
to imagine left-leaning researchers inadvertently constructing studies that pit more plausible 
liberal beliefs against less plausible conservative ones, or simply being better able to write liberal 
stimulus materials that are compelling and believable (and vice-versa for right-leaning 
researchers). Furthermore, studies using samples that underrepresent one end of the political 
spectrum could produce similar distortions. These possibilities could lead to overestimating bias 
for liberals or conservatives, which highlights the importance of thorough pre-testing of stimulus 
materials for information equivalence across conditions (including the possibility of main effects 
for information believability), as well as careful attention to the composition of participant 
samples. 
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Supplemental Figure 1. Mock data illustrating the importance of considering the general believability of liberal-consistent and 
conservative-consistent information. All three panels show partisan bias as expected, but if one set of information is more believable 
overall, then the magnitude of liberal and conservative bias may be affected.  !
 
 
